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"I don't expect a dime, but I'd like to see someone's hide on the fence for
allowing this to happen."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than forty state attorneys general and innumerable counties, cities,
and tribal nations are either investigating or actively litigating over-promotion
and related claims against opioid manufacturers and other participants in the
opioid prescription drug supply chain. Following multidistrict litigation
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(MDL) consolidation, approximately one thousand cases are before Judge
Daniel Polster in the Northern District of Ohio. 2 For some, the Cleveland
litigation overseen by Judge Polster seems to have almost mythic properties.
For example, a New York Times headline asked, "Can This Judge Solve the
Opioid Crisis?" 3 At first sight, the opioid litigation seems to embrace the
properties often expected of major (including mass tort) personal injury
litigation, such as finding the truth, expressing righteous indignation,
allocating blame, deterrence, and redistributing ill-gotten moneys to those the
alleged tortious conduct has hurt. 4
This Article argues that these and other expectations surrounding the
opioid litigation require some recalibration. There is no doubt that some of
this enthusiasm has been generated by parallels drawn to the 1998 Tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).' However, those parallels themselves
need tempering. More importantly, the role of opioid litigation needs a context
broader than pharmaceutical misconduct-one that better expresses the
broader issues causative of and raised by the opioid overdose epidemic. While
the goals that underpin the litigation are important, they are relatively minor
compared to the broader features of the opioid epidemic, particularly the
opioid overdose crisis. These are issues that litigation-or even an
exceptionally well-crafted settlement are unlikely to solve.
The arguments advanced here are, first, that concentrating on the MDL
litigation may endorse the flawed gateway or vector analysis of the opioid
overdose epidemic. Second, any compensation derived from successful
prosecution of the litigation (or, more likely, its settlement) while not
insignificant is more likely to enrich the plaintiffs (politically) and their
attorneys (financially) than make a major impact on the social and healthcare
costs already incurred or begin to cure the adverse social determinants of
health that underpin the epidemic. Third, even when measured against the
flawed tobacco settlement of 1998, any settlement is unlikely to have a
positive long-term impact or any major public health role after the checks have
been written and cashed. Overall, this Article takes the pessimistic position

2. Id.; see also Eric Heisig, Ohio Governments Say They Won't Argue Specific
Prescriptions Were Improper in 2019 Opioid Trial, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2018/10/ohio-governments-say-they-wont-argue-spe
cific-prescriptions-were-improper-in-2019-opioid-trial.html (suggesting that the total has risen
to more than 1,000).
3.
Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html.
4.
See, e.g., Mitch Smith & Monica Davey, With Overdoses on Rise, Cities and Counties
Look for Someone to Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/20/us/opioid-cities-counties-lawsuits.html.
5.
See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
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that this "litigation unicorn" will deflect attention from the true causes of the
opioid overdose epidemic, thereby averting appropriate remediation while
creating an improbable expectation that the settlement will fund either
necessary treatment programs for those suffering from opioid use disorder
(OUD) or their children suffering from neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS).
The Article proceeds as follows: first, there is a brief sketch of the federal
MDL litigation and some competing state court claims. 6 Second, the tobacco
litigation and settlement of the 1990s are compared, with particular attention
paid to the dispositions of damages collected. 7 Third, and the core of the
Article, is a discussion of "blaming" litigation and how that may perpetuate
the opioid epidemic's stigmatizing moral defect narrative.' Fourth, the Article
takes a deeper dive into the barriers facing those in Cleveland trying to
hammer out a settlement with particular attention paid to potential remedies. 9
II.

MDL AND

OTHER OPIOID LITIGATION

Various cities, counties, states, and tribal nations (political units)' 0 have
sued the manufacturers and distributors of prescription opioids and face suit
on a variety of factual claims based on numerous doctrinal theories." Central
to the litigation, however, are two allegations. First, the manufacturers
overstated the benefits and downplayed the risks of the use of their opioids
while aggressively marketing them (the overpromotion claim); and second,
that the distributors failed to monitor or detect suspicious orders (the diversion
claim). 12
These are not the first lawsuits brought against the opioid manufacturers.
Rebecca Haffajee and Michelle Mello have detailed various allegations made
by individual patients and political units beginning in the early 2000s. 13 The
individual patients-they argue-faced considerable barriers to success based
upon product liability theories such as "design" allegations (i.e. failure to

6.
See infra notes 10-57 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra notes 58-97 and accompanying text.
8.
See infra notes 98-140 and accompanying text.
9.
See infra notes 141-212 and accompanying text.
10. Smith & Davey, supra note 4; Native American Tribes Sue Opioid Manufactures,
Distributors, CBS NEWS (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nativeamerican-tribes-sue-opioid-manufacturers-distributors.
11. In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., Transfer Order, MDL No. 2804, J.P.M.L., 3
(Dec. 5, 2017).
12. Id.; see generally Andrew Kolodny et al., The PrescriptionOpioidandHeroin Crisis:
A PublicHealthApproach to an Epidemic ofAddiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559 (2015).
13. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies'Liabilityfor the Opioid
Epidemic, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2301-03 (2017).
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include an antagonist ingredient) and failure to warn about addiction risks, as
well as misrepresentations about the drugs' safety.1 4 These barriers included
FDA approval-tending to negate defective design" or warning' 6 claimsor protection of the latter under the Learned Intermediary Rule.' 7
Increasingly, plaintiffs are basing their claims on allegations of
overpromotion and diversion.' 8 These claims owe at least some of their
conceptualization to suits brought and settled in the mid-2000s by states and
the federal government alleging that the opioid manufacturers had engaged in
various misdeeds such as misbranding, unlawful off-label use marketing,
Medicaid fraud, and failing to avert diversion. ' This litigation is highly
complex in its own right, and such complexity is further amplified by the
MDL frame and dynamics surrounding powerful "repeat player" law firms
representing the plaintiffs. 20 The litigation also has to deal with the sheer
number of plaintiffs and the heterogeneity of damages suffered.
In December 2017, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation held that "the actions in this litigation involve common questions
of fact, and that centralization in the Northern District of Ohio will serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of the litigation." 21 At that time, the MDL Panel consolidated most
federal claims (then already numbering over four hundred) in the Northern
District of Ohio before U.S. District Judge Daniel Polster. 22 Thereafter,
additional political units have joined the litigation.23

14. Id.at2301.
15. See, e.g., Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 808 F.3d 281, 293 (6th Cir.
2015) (preemption).
16. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-4 (2018) (presumption of adequacy).
17. See, e.g., Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555 (N.D. Tex. 2006);
Haffajee & Mello, supra note 13, at 2301.
18. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14-cv04361 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2015).
19. Haffaiee & Mello, supra note 13, at 2301; see, e.g., Press Release, Or. Dep't of
Justice, AG Files Judgment with Purdue Pharma over Marketing of Oxycontin (May 8, 2007),
https://www.doj.state.or.us/media-home/news-media-releases/ag-files-judgment-purdue-pharm
a-marketing-oxycontin.
20. See Daniel Fisher, Usual Suspects: Lawyers Used to Getting Their Way in MDL
Process to Lead Opioid Litigation, FORBES
(Jan. 23, 2018,
10:03 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/01/23/usual-suspects-lawyers-used-togetting-their-way-in-mdl-process-to-lead-opioid-litigation/#4ae604a34de6.
21. In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
22. Id.; Hoffman, supra note 3.
23. Courtney Hessler, More Cities in WV Join Opioid Lawsuits, HERALD-DISPATCH
(Mar. 17, 2018), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/more-cities-in-wv-join-opioid-lawsuits/
article_b7blO6aa-1d91-5a6c-babf-cae5d8548d2f.html; More Indiana Cities File Lawsuits
Against Distributors,ManufacturersAmid Opioid Crisis, FOX59 WEB (Jan. 8, 2018, 2:43 PM)
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Not all the plaintiffs have been so willing to participate in the Cleveland
litigation. For example, plaintiffs representing NAS infants have sought to
have a separate MDL for that cohort on the basis that "the interests of the
governmental and corporate parties represented by the MDL leadership are
fundamentally in conflict with those of these infants." 2 4 Not only did the MDL
panel deny this centralization request, 25 but it subsequently ordered that the
NAS infants' claims should be consolidated in the Cleveland litigation. 26
Another cohort that is seeking to distinguish itself is the combination of 448
Native American tribes, some of whom are plaintiffs in the MDL litigation.
The tribes argue that they have been disproportionally injured during the
opioid epidemic, with an overdose mortality rate in some areas six times the
percentage of non-Hispanic whites. 27 The tribes, too, have argued that the
state plaintiffs have not adequately represented their interests. 28
The defendant type is also expanding. For example, intermediaries in the
drug supply chain such as pharmacy benefit managers are being added to the
lawsuits. 29 A notable absentee from the plaintiff ranks is the federal
government. In March 2018, the United States Department of Justice filed a
statement of interest requesting Judge Polster grant it time to consider whether
the federal government would participate in the litigation,3 0 eventually
deciding only to enter as an amicus.31

https://fox59.com/2018/01/08/more-indiana-cities-file-lawsuits-against-distributorsmanufacturers-amid-opioid-crisis.
24. Motion for Transfer of Actions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for Coordinated or
Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, In re Children Born Opioid-Dependent, MDL No. 2872
(J.P.M.L. Sept. 20, 2018).
25. In re Infants Born Opioid-Dependent Products Liability Litig., 350 F. Supp. 3d 1377,
1381 (J.P.M.L. 2018).
26. Transfer Order, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L. Dec.
6,2018).
27. Brief Amici Curiae of 448 Federally Recognized Tribes in Opposition to Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss Tribal Claims at *2, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804
(J.P.M.L. Oct. 5, 2018).
28. Id.
29. Casey Ross, A South Texas County Drags PBMs into Nationwide Lawsuit over
Opioids, STATNEWS (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/02/26/texas-pbmopioid-lawsuit.
30. Nate Raymond, U.S. Seeks Time to Consider Joining Opioid Litigation, REUTERS
(Mar. 2, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-opioids/u-s-seekstime-to-consider-joining-opioid-litigation-idUSKCNIGE2CO.
31. Nate Raymond, Justice Department Seeks Role in Opioid Settlement Talks, REUTERS
(Apr. 2, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation/justicedepartment-seeks-role-in-opioid-settlement-talks-idUSKCN1 H9 1XR.
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MDL transfers permit "coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings" 32 and are designed "to avoid duplication of discovery, to prevent
inconsistent pretrial rulings, and to conserve the resources of the parties, their
counsel and the judiciary." 33 In practice, MDL transfers are designed to
encourage settlement. There have been several scheduled settlement
conferences, there are reports of ongoing talks between the parties, and,
somewhat optimistically, Judge Polster originally informed the parties that he
wanted to see a settlement in 2018.34
The MDL statute requires a remand back to the originating federal district
courts. 35 However, in practice the cases are often moved along (or at least

nudged towards settlement) by holding some bellwether trials to further
narrow down the issues in dispute and their commonality (or lack thereof)
across the consolidated cases.36 In April 2018, Judge Polster set an aggressive
timetable, ordering a March 2019 trial date for three combined cases filed in
Ohio. 37 However, in August 2018, he delayed those trials until September

2019.38 The judge is already on record stating that he considers even limited
bellwether litigation necessary, noting that it was "necessary to do it, and
[they're] doing it, but it's not a substitute or replacement in any way" for
moving towards a settlement. 39 Judge Polster's optimism should be contrasted
with that of the Oklahoma Attorney General, who in a state court filing
opined, "The MDL settlement process is stuck in glue and the first trial in the

32. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
33. U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, OVERVIEW OF PANEL,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/overview-panel-0 (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
34. Daniel Fisher, PlaintiffLawyers See Nationwide Settlement as Only Endfor Opioid
Lawsuits, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2018, 6:39 AM)
[hereinafter Fisher, Plaintiff],
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/06/plaintiff-lawyers-see-nationwide-settle
ment-as-only-end-for-opioid-lawsuits/#24dfc3c57bc2.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
36. See generally Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill, & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether
Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2325 (2008); Alexandra D. Lahav,
Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 579 (2008).
37. Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Scheduled 2019 Trial in Opioid Litigation, REUTERS
(Apr. 11, 2018, 7:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation/u-s-judgeschedules-2019-trial-in-opioid-litigation-idUSKBN1H13EI.
38. Eric Heisig, Opioid Trials for Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, Summit County Pushed
Back to September 2019, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Heisig, Opioid],
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2018/08/opioid-trials-for-cleveland-cu.
html.
39. Eric Heisig, Cleveland Judge in Opioid Litigation says Trial Prep Is Aiding in
Settlement
Talks
with
Big
Pharma, CLEVELAND.COM
(May
10,
2018),
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2018/05/clevelandjudge inopioidliti.ht
ml.
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and it will be

moved back again." 40

One difficult issue which has already arisen in preparation for the
bellwether trials is the extent to which the plaintiffs will attempt to prove a
causal nexus between their overpromotion claim and the writing of specific
prescriptions. The defendants requested that the plaintiffs identify specific
patients and prescriptions, and tie those to specific allegations of defendant
misfeasance. 41 The plaintiffs' response was that "all prescriptions for opioids
[in the bellwether cities and counties] ... were influenced by Defendants'
deceptive marketing." 42 Thus, at least in the bellwether trials, plaintiffs have
declined to make arguments about individual prescriptions, 43 relying instead
on aggregate proof based on the pattern of activities and behaviors. 44
Parallel to the MDL cases, some states and other political units continue
along a different path, proceeding independently in their own local courts,
arguing theories as diverse as state law false claims and deceptive or unfair
consumer practices. 45 These independent state claims not only feature
additional theories of recovery or defendant cohortS 46 (even malpractice cases
against individual doctorS 47), but also illustrate divergent tactics, as the

40. The State's Emergency Motion to Show Cause for Purdue's Intentional Disregard of
Two Court Orders and Failure to Provide Witness as Ordered by the Court at *2, Oklahoma ex
rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 2018).
41. Bellwether Plaintiffs' Submission in Response to Discovery Ruling No. 5 at *2-3, In
re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2018).
42. Id. at *2.
43. See id. at *3.
44. Daniel Fisher, Cleveland, Akron Will Try to Prove Opioid Cases Without a Single
Bogus Prescription, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2018, 10:36 AM) [hereinafter Fisher, Cleveland],
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/10/25/cleveland-akron-will-try-to-prove-opi
oid-cases-without-a-single-bogus-prescription/#2cc2e57b3511; see also Daniel Fisher, Time
Running Out for Lawyers Suing OpioidIndustryto Show Specific Proof LEGAL NEWSLINE (Oct.
20, 2018), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/511606 124-time-running-out-for-lawyers-suingopioid-industry-to-show-specific-proof.
45. See, e.g., Complaint TT 260-311, at 79-91, Indiana v. Purdue Pharma L.P., (Nov. 14,
2018), http://media.ibj.com/Lawyer/websites/opinions/index.php?pdf=2018/november/Purduecomplaint.pdf.
46. Bertha Coombs, Florida'sOpioidLawsuit Against CVS and Walgreens Takes Aim at
Distributors with Deep Pockets,
CNBC
(Nov.
20,
2018,
11:08
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/20/floridas-opioid-lawsuit-against-cvs-and-walgreens-aims-atdistributors.html.
47. James F. McCarty, Two Cleveland Clinic Doctors Accused in Lawsuits of
Contributing
to
Three
Opioid
Overdose
Deaths,
CLEVELAND.COM,
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2018/10/twocleveland clinic doctors a.html
(last updated Oct. 29, 2018); see also Brian Melley, CaliforniaDoctorAccused of Prescribing
Drugs
in
5
Deaths,
AP
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.apnews.com/
514fad693a3b47f6b00663adf26edb4c.
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political units apparently believe they will receive better results before their
own courts and see advantage in trying to reach judgment or settlement ahead
of the MDL cases. 48 Suffolk County, New York, has even filed suit against
members of the Sackler family, who own Purdue Pharma 49 and reportedly
have a net worth of $13 billion. 0
More than forty state attorneys general are either investigating" or
actively litigating claims against participants in the drug supply, claims that
may end up consolidated in Cleveland or proceed to trial more locally.5 2
Those, too, are the subject of ongoing settlement talks. 3 Some political units,
including some tribal nations concerned that consolidation will hurt their
cases,5 4 have raised unsuccessful objections to the MDL transfer." It is
unclear whether the defendants will agree to any settlement other than a global
one that includes all plaintiffs.5 6 However, forcing all parties into a mandatory
class action would be quite controversial. 1

&

48. See, e.g., Andrew Joseph, Why Houston and Other Cities Want Nothing to do with
the
Massive
National
Opioid Lawsuit,
STATNEWS
(Mar.
27,
2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/03/27/houston-national-opioid-lawsuit;
Bill Estep, Rural
Clinics ClaimDrug Companies "Engineered"Addiction Crisisto Drive Up Profits, LEXINGTON
HERALD LEADER, https://www.kentucky.com/news/state/article206603384.html (last updated
Mar. 24, 2018, 11:10 AM).
49. Cassandra Basler, Suffolk County Sues PurduePharmaFamily over Opioids, WSHU
(Oct. 25, 2018), http://www.wshu.org/post/suffolk-county-sues-purdue-pharma-family-overopioids#stream/0.
50. Chase Peterson-Withorn, Fortune of Family Behind OxyContin Drops Amid
Declining Prescriptions, FORBES (June 29, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/chasewithorn/2016/06/29/fortune-of-family-behind-oxycontin-drops-amid-declining-pres
criptions/#3 1b6fd1c6341; see generally Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family that Built an Empire
ofPain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/thefamily-that-built-an-empire-of-pain.
51. Press Release, Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, Bipartisan Coalition of AGs
Expand Multistate Investigation into Opioid Crisis (Sept. 19, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-schneiderman-bipartisan-coalition-ags-expand-multistate-investigation-opioidcrisis.
52. Overview of State Litigation to Combat the Opioid Epidemic, Ass'N STATE
TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS (Feb. 22, 2018, 2:55 PM), http://www.astho.org/
StatePublicHealth/Overview-of-State-Litigation-to-Combat-the-Opioid-Epidemic/02-22-18.
53. Jef Feeley & Jared S. Hopkins, PurduePharmaDiscloses Negotiations with AGs on
Opioids, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-11-30/opioid-lawyers-warned-by-judge-cases-face-serious-hurdles; Heisig,
Opioid, supra note 38.
54. Fisher, Cleveland, supra note 44.
55. In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., supra note 11.
56. Fisher, Plaintiff supra note 34.
57. See Daniel Fisher, Opioid Lawyers Say Settlement May Hinge on ForcingPlaintiffs
into Class Action, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/legalnewsline/2018/09/27/opioid-lawyers-say-settlement-may-hinge-on-forcing-plain
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III. THE TOBACCO COMPARISON

From their inception, the opioid claims could be compared to most of the
high-profile public health mass litigation cases of the past fifty years-cases
from the products liability asbestos cases of the 1980s,5

to public nuisance

actions against gun manufacturers 59 and sellers, 60 to consumers arguing links
between fast food and health issues such as obesity. 6 1
However, most attention has been lavished on comparisons with the
tobacco litigation of the 1990s. In particular, the political unit opioid plaintiffs
have been eyeing the large settlement big tobacco reached with the states, 62
while some plaintiffs' attorneys are even reprising their roles in the later
litigation. 63 There are many parallels to the tobacco litigation, but there are
also equally salient differences. As is well known, products liability cases
brought by individuals against the tobacco industry generally were
unsuccessful. Allegations of defective design typically failed because there
was no feasible alternative design, 64 and few courts endorsed the idea of
intrinsically dangerous products being defective.65 Indeed, only recently has

tiffs-into-class-action/#2e9abf59 1 d Ic; cf David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class
Action: The Only Optionfor Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002).
58. See generally Rand Corporation, INST. Civ. JUST., Asbestos Litigation,
https://www.rand.org/jie/justice-policy/civil-justice/pubs/asbestos.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2019).
59. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
60. See generally Anti-Gun Lawsuits (1): A Public Nuisance, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19,
1998), https://www.economist.com/united-states/1998/11/19/a-public-nuisance.
61. Michelle M. Mello, Eric B. Rimm, & David M. Studdert, The McLawsuit: The FastFood Industry and Legal Accountability for Obesity, 22 HEALTH AFF. 207 (2003),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.22.6.207.
62. See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, OpioidLawsuitLooks More Like a Tobacco Settlement Every
Day,
FORBES
(Aug.
25,
2018,
8:15
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/
brucejapsen/2018/08/25/opioid-lawsuits-looking-more-like-tobacco-settlements-every-day/#5
63a8bb74f4f; see also German Lopez, The Growing Number of Lawsuits Against Opioid
Companies, Explained, Vox (May 15, 2018, 5:22 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/6/7/15724054/opioid-epidemic-lawsuits-purdue-oxycontin.
63. Esm6 E. Deprez & Paul Barrett, The Lawyer Who Beat Big Tobacco Takes on the
Opioid Industry, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Oct.
5, 2017,
4:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-05/the-lawyer-who-beat-big-tobacco-tak
es-on-the-opioid-industry.
64. See, e.g., Hosford v. BRK Brands, Inc., 223 So. 3d 199, 199 (Ala. 2016) (finding
insufficient evidence for existence of safer, practical, alternative design for an ionization smoke
alarm).
65. Cf Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982); see
generally Nicolas P. Terry, StricterProductsLiability, 52 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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aggressively pursued industry practices.67 The other classic product liability
claim one for failure to warn was generally unavailable because of
federally required warnings. 68 During this time, the tobacco industry
conducted a public relations offensive defending the safety of their products.69
The litigation "dam" was finally breached in Cipollone v. Liggett, Inc. 70
when the Supreme Court adopted a somewhat narrow reading of the
preemptive effect of The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 196971 and
permitted claims traditionally brought under state law, including express
warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy. 72 Shortly
thereafter, the executives of the big tobacco companies found themselves in a
Congressional hearing being publicly blamed for the health consequences of
smoking. 73 Afterwards, whistleblower documents-arguably showing that
the industry had known of the risks of smoking for decades and suppressed
evidence

began to surface. 74

Political unit claims began in 1994 when Mississippi became the first
state to sue tobacco firms to recover its Medicaid costs attendant to treating
smokers, 7 followed by other state claims for losses incurred by their pubic
insurance programs. In total, the attorneys general of forty-six states brought

66. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009).
67. See, e.g., Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, F.D.A. Seeks Restrictions on Teens' Access
to Flavored E-Cigarettes and a Ban on Menthol Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/health/ecigarettes-fda-flavors-ban.html.
68. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92 § 2, (1965); The
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, (1970).
69. See, e.g., A Frank Statement, FRONTLNE PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/settlement/timelines/frank.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
70. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
72. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-3 1.
73. Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Chiefs Say CigarettesAren'tAddictive, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15,
1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/15/us/tobacco-chiefs-say-cigarettes-aren-t-addictive
.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=8CF071B6822EO758B90F0D199497942C&gwt=pay.
74. See, e.g., Tobacco Litigation Documents, UNIV. CAL. S.F. https://www.industry
documentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/research-tools/litigation-documents (last visited Jan. 20,
2019); see also Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Was Silent on Hazards, N.Y. TIMES (May 7,
1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/07/us/tobacco-company-was-silent-on-hazards.html;
see generally Lisa Bero, Implications of the Tobacco Industry Documentsfor PublicHealth and
Policy, 24 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 267-88 (2003).
75. Michael Janofsky, MississippiSeeks Damagesfrom Tobacco Companies,N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/24/us/mississippi-seeks-damages-fromtobacco-companies.html.
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suit.76 In November 1998, the states and the major tobacco companies settled

the litigation in what is referred to as the Master Settlement Agreement
77
(MSA).
Subsequently, in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,78 the federal
government prevailed against the cigarette manufacturers and tobacco trade
organizations on a variety of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) allegations relating to misleading and deceptive marketing
practices. 79 The government was less successful as far as pleaded remedies
such as disgorging profits,s0 although the district court did rule that the
companies had to publish five corrective statements in the media and on their
product packaging."
After Cipollone and the disclosure of thousands of pages of industry
documents, actions by individual smokers or their survivors have seen more
success. The epicenter has been Florida, with these individual actions
prompted by the 2006 decertification of a class action by the Florida Supreme
Court.82 The court allowed the class members to pursue their claims
individually while preserving some of the common liability findings. 83
Thousands of claims resulted, with plaintiffs winning large numbers of multimillion dollar judgments.8 4 An additional line of cases has also opened,
following a Supreme Court ruling that state consumer protection claims
alleging that descriptions of some cigarettes as "light" or "low tar" were not
preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act." Plaintiffs
have been less successful in preserving large punitive damage awards upon

76.

Master

Settlement

Agreement,

PUB.

HEALTH

LAW

CTR.,

https://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/master-settlement-agreement.pdf
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (listing forty-six state attorneys as the plaintiffs) [hereinafter Master
Settlement Agreement].
77. Id.
78. 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006).
79. Id. at 1; see also United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (affirming district court ruling in large part against manufacturer).
80. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1095.
81. Order #34 Remand, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 1:99-cv-02496-GK
(D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2012) (order granting discussion regarding the corrective statements); see, e.g.,
Jacqueline Howard, Court-Ordered 'Corrective Statements' to Appear on Cigarette Boxes,
CNN (Nov. 21, 2018, 10:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/21/health/cigarette-boxstatements-bn/index.html.
82. Engle v. Liggett Grp., 945 So.2d 1246, 1246 (Fla. 2006).
83. Id. at 1269-70.
84. Jeffrey Schweers, Thousands of Tobacco Lawsuits in the Pipeline, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2017/02/01/thousands-tobacco-lawsuitspipeline/97135082 (last updated Feb. 6, 2017, 2:01 PM).
85. Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008).
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appeal, 8 6 although in 2017, the Supreme Court of Florida held that an award
of thirty million dollars was not unconstitutionally excessive. 87
From the standpoint of those engaged in the opioid litigation, the most
interesting aspect of the tobacco story is the MSA of 1998." The MSA
provided that the states would receive approximately $246 billion during the
first twenty-five years of the settlement with payments continuing in
perpetuity thereafter.89 The MSA also included some explicit public health
remedies, including limitations on certain advertising and marketing to
children, the creation of a research and educational foundation focused on teen
smoking and smoking cessation, and the dissolution of certain tobacco
industry initiatives that combated research findings about the dangers of
smoking. 90

The recitals under the MSA contained language suggesting the purpose
of the settlement and the intended use of its proceeds by the states.91 However,
the agreement contained no specific or detailed language requiring the states
to use the proceeds for specific tobacco-related or public health purposes. In
practice, only a very small percentage of the settlement funds have been used
to encourage smoking cessation or otherwise address public health
priorities. 92 For example, a 2007 report from the United States Government
Accounting Office found that, on average, states allocated just thirty percent
of their annual settlement receipts to healthcare (including funding Medicaid,
CHIP, and making payments to providers) and 22.9 percent to cover budget
deficits. 93 States have also used these funds for education and infrastructure
projects. Only 3.5 percent has been used for tobacco control. Ironically, South
Carolina and North Carolina even used MSA funds to assist tobacco growers

86. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 348 (2007).
87. Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 308 (Fla. 2017).
88. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 76.
89. Id. at 29.
90. PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE MASTER
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 3-4 (2015).
91. See, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 76, at 1-2 ("[P]ursuant to terms
which will achieve for the Settling States and their citizens significant funding for the
advancement of public health measures .... ).
92. A State-by-State Look at the 1998 Tobacco Settlement 20 Years Later, CAMPAIGN
FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/statereport (last
updated Dec. 13, 2018).
93. LISA SHAMES, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., TOBACCO SETTLEMENT,
STATES' ALLOCATIONS OF PAYMENTS FROM TOBACCO COMPANIES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000
THROUGH 2005, 3 (2007).
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as demand slowed. 94 A six-state study argued that "far less is being spent on
tobacco control and health programs than would have been anticipated in view
of the states' tort claims against the companies." 95 This is despite evidence
that the funding of tobacco control has an extremely strong return on
investment. 96 Another study concluded that "MSA resources have been
significantly diverted from tobacco control and treatment into other state
policy activities." 9 7 The tobacco litigation and settlements raise significant
issues regarding the opioid litigation and the use of potential settlement funds,
addressed in detail below.
IV.

THE HEART OF THE UNICORN: PERPETUATING MORAL DEFECT

Clearly there are strong retributive and deterrent motives behind the
opioid litigation. As the City of Chicago's corporation counsel stated, "We
brought suit because we recognized that the companies had to both be held
accountable for their long-term marketing practices that really created this
market and fostered a misleading attitude toward these drugs as pain
management ... [a]nd then to make sure that they reform the industry going
forward." 98
These motives and related emotions are equally understandable. The
headline-grabbing metric surrounding the overdose epidemic has been the
death toll, estimated at almost fifty thousand for 2017.99 Sadly, that number
does not include the almost incalculable familial 0 0 and economic disruptions

94. Allison MacMunn, Tobacco Settlement Anniversary Marks 20 Years of Opportunity
for States to Prevent, Reduce Tobacco Use, AM. LUNG Ass'N (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.lung.org/about-us/media/press-releases/tobacco-settlement-20-years.html.
95. Frank A. Sloan et al., States' Allocations of Funds from the Tobacco Master
SettlementAgreement, 24 HEALTH AFF. 220, 224 (2005).
96. James Lightwood & Stanton A. Glantz, The Effect ofthe California Tobacco Control
Program on Smoking Prevalence, Cigarette Consumption, and HealthcareCosts: 1989-2008,
8 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2013).
97. Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement and Its
Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later, 137 CHEST 692, 697 (2010).
98. Katie Zezima, As the OpioidEpidemic Rages, the FightAgainst Addiction Moves to
an Ohio Courtroom, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2018) (quoting Edward N. Siskel),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/as-the-opioid-epidemic-rages-the-fight-against-add

iction-moves-to-an-ohio-courtroom/2018/04/07/97b82b84-2636- 11 e8-874bd517e912fl25story.html?utmterm=.e6f351alaf68.
99. Overdose
Death
Rates,
NAT'L
INST.
ON
DRUG
ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates (last updated
Jan. 2019).
100. See, e.g., April Dirks, The Opioid Epidemic: Impact on Children and Families, J.
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
(2018), http://www.jpsychiatrypsychiatric
disord.com/articles/the-opioid-epidemic-impact-on-children-and-families.html.
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throughout the entire country. The former includes direct and indirect harms
caused to family members, including those born with NAS and increases in
imprisonment.' 0' The price tag for the latter is estimated to have been one
trillion dollars between 2001 and 2016, and is projected at another five
hundred billion dollars from 2016 to 2020.102
The healthcare system including the pharmaceutical companies and
others in the opioid prescription drug supply chain must bear considerable
responsibility for the increase in OUD and the opioid overdose epidemic.1 03
For example, the marketing of the pain medication OxyContin® as "nonaddictive" clearly influenced clinicians."1 04 Health insurers and managed care
providers were also complicit, as they favored pharmaceutical approaches to
pain over more expensive multidisciplinary approaches. 0 5 Even healthcare
regulators should bear some responsibility for designating pain as the "fifth
vital sign"10 6 and introducing pain management into reimbursementimpacting patient satisfaction scores. 0 7 Even law enforcement should not
escape scrutiny. For example, a bipartisan Congressional investigation of
"opioid-dumping" into West Virginia not only reported "failures in
distributors' anti-diversion efforts" but also "uncover[ed] gaps in the DEA's

101. See, e.g., Michelle Chen, Is the Opioid Crisis Leading to a Spike in the White
Incarceration Rate?, NATION (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-opioidcrisis-has-led-to-a-spike-in-the-white-incarceration-rate; Liz Moyer, Jail and Opioids Keep
More Men out of the Workforce in the US than in Other Big Economies: Goldman, CNBC (Jul.
12, 2018, 4:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/12/jail-and-opioids-keep-more-men-outof-the-us-workforce.html.
102. Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis in U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALTARUM
(Feb.
13,
2018)
[hereinafter
Economic Toll],
https://altarum.org/about/news-andevents/economic-toll-of-opioid-crisis-in-u-s-exceeded- 1 -trillion-since-200 1.
103. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, StructuralDeterminism Amplifying the OpioidCrisis:

It's the Healthcare, Stupid!, 11 NE. UNIV. L. REV. 315 (2019).
104. SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA'S OPIATE EPIDEMIC

124-27 (2016).
105. Marcia L. Meldrum, The Ongoing OpioidPrescriptionEpidemic: HistoricalContext,

106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1365, 1365 (2016).
106. David W. Baker, History of the Joint Commission's Pain Standards, Lessons for

Today's Prescription Opioid Epidemic, 317 JAMA 1117, 1118 (2017); see also Natalia E.
Morone & Debra K. Weiner, Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign: Exposing the Vital Need for Pain
Education, 35 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 1728, 1728 (2013).
107. See generally Jay S. Lee et al., PostoperativeOpioidPrescribingandthe Pain Scores
on Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey, 317 JAMA

2013, 2013 (2017).
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enforcement posture, both related to its capabilities nationwide and its
oversight in West Virginia." 0
Equally, whatever one's judgment about the relative responsibility of the
pharmaceutical industry in causing the opioid overdose crisis, clearly it has
failed to deliver any useful solutions. Indeed, there are segments of the
industry that seem to view the crisis not as an opportunity to repair damage,
but as one for great profit. For example, Matthew Rosenberg and his
colleagues noted very large increases in the prices of almost all formulations
of the overdose-reversal drug naloxone-increases of 244% to 3,797% during

2006-2017.109 A 60 Minutes investigation showed that one brand-name
formulation containing a few cents of naloxone cost over $4,000.110
Tort litigation while not an explicitly punitive or criminalizing modelstill promotes a "blame frame" rather than a system-reform frame.' Yet,
considerable care must be taken in apportioning blame. The current opioid
crisis notwithstanding, its seriousness is only the most recent of several waves
of addiction.11 2 The opioid crisis is one which has substantially morphed over
the past three to four years. In 2016, just over nineteen thousand persons died
of overdoses associated with prescription opioids, and there has been some
relative stability over the prior five years. 113 In contrast, almost thirty
thousand people died of overdoses associated with synthetic opioids
(predominately Fentanyl) in 2017, a massive spike over the same time period
(a twenty-two-fold increase from 2002 to 2017).114
The opioid litigation or at least its rhetoric-is built on the same
fundamental misunderstandings of the opioid overdose epidemic as calls for
additional criminalization. First, it adopts a stigmatizing "moral defect" frame
which assigns causality to drug users and their suppliers, junkies, dealers, and

108. HOUSE ENERGY & COM. COMM., RED FLAGS AND WARNING SIGNS IGNORED:
OPIOID DISTRIBUTION AND ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS IN WEST VIRGINIA 8 (2018),
https://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/assets/2616-9819/Opioid-Distribution-Report-FinalREV.pdf.
109. Matthew Rosenberg et al., Trends andEconomicsDriversfor United States Naloxone

Pricing, January 2006 to February2017, 86 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 86, 87 (2018).
110. Lesley Stahl, Evzio: The Overdose-Reversal Drug with a $4000+ Price Tag, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/evzio-the-opioid-overdose-reversaldrug-naloxone-with-a-4000-price-tag-60-minutes; cf Kalko, Authorized Generic for EVZIO
(NaloxoneHCI injection) to be Available at a ReducedList Priceof$178, CISION PRNEWSWIRE
(Dec. 12, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/authorized-generic-forevzio-naloxone-hcl-injection-to-be-available-at-a-reduced-list-price-of- 178-300763797.html.

111. Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the OpioidEpidemic: The Role of Courts
in a NationalHealth Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 351 (2018).
112. David Herzberg et al., Recurring Epidemics of Pharmaceutical Drug Abuse in

America: Time for an All-Drug Strategy, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 408, 408 (2016).
113. Overdose Death Rates, supra note 99.

114. Id.
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drug lords-albeit modified by substituting in patients with prescriptionsprescribers, pharmacy benefit managers, pharmacies, and pharmaceutical
manufacturers." 5 Second, the recent shift from medically-sourced
prescription opioids to illicit synthetics is explained by the oft-criticized
vector model or gateway analysis of the epidemic.11 6 That model argues that,
having become addicted to opioid painkillers, those with OUD moved to illicit
synthetics as the prescribing of opioids was curtailed or the prices of the illicit
synthetics dropped below those of diverted prescriptions drugs." 7
Like most explanations of this "wicked problem,"" 8 there is a grain of
truth in the vector model. One study found that 79.5 percent of heroin users
previously had used prescription opioids; however, the same study found that
only 3.6 percent of prescription opioid users transitioned to heroin.11 9 The real
problem with the vector model is in suggesting a simple cause and effect
model to explain a far more complex problem. The real causes of the opioid
crisis are social determinants of health, which are defined as the "complex,
integrated, and overlapping social structures and economic systems that are
responsible for most health inequities."1 20 Thus, insofar as it places the blame
for the opioid overdose epidemic at the feet of pharmaceutical manufacturers
and distributors, the opioid litigation is misappropriating a public health
narrative to serve its own purposes. Indeed, it fully endorses the vector model,
as it must do, in attempting to place responsibility for the harm caused by
illicit synthetics on the manufacturers of prescription opioids.
Adopting a blame-based model implicates not only defendants but also
plaintiffs. Inevitably, defendants will attempt to shift any alleged
responsibility to their physician customers, 121 patients, and to the latter's

115. Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic
Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. ON HEALTH 182, 184 (2018).
116. See id. at 183.
117. Sarah G. Mars et al., "Every 'Never' I Ever Said Came True ": Transitionsfrom
OpioidPillsto Heroin Injecting, 25 INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 257, 258 (2014).
118. Jonathan C. Lee, The Opioid Crisis Is a Wicked Problem, 27 AM. J. ADDICTIONS 51,
51(2018).
119. PRADIP K. MUHURI, JOSEPH C. GFROERER & M. CHRISTINE DAVIES, ASSOCIATIONS
OF NONMEDICAL PAIN RELIEVER USE AND INITIATION OF HEROIN USE IN THE UNITED STATES

1 (CBHSQ Data Review ed., 2013).
120. Definitions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
nchhstp/socialdeterminants/definitions.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2014) (defining "social

determinants of health"); see, e.g., Dasgupta et al., supra note 115, at 1; DAYNA BOWEN
MATTHEW, UN-BURYING THE LEAD: PUBLIC HEALTH TOOLS ARE THE KEY TO BEATING THE
OPIOID EPIDEMIC 4-5 (Brooking ed., 2018).

121. See Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing
Stewart v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 780 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. App. 1989)) (discussing how
defendants shift responsibility via the learned intermediary rule).
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"addict" patients. Indeed, two of the national defendants have sued drug
dealers and Internet pharmaceutical sites ("illegal supply chain defendants")
in an attempt to shift the blame for opioid diversion.1 22
Shifting blame to patients can be accomplished by arguing lack of
causation. For example, that the defendant's condition was not caused by the
defendant's overpromotion but by the plaintiffs pre-existing addiction or
some blameworthy conduct. For example, in the well-known case of Price v.
Purdue Pharma Co.,123 an opioid manufacturer successfully argued that the
doctor-shopping plaintiff was guilty of illegal conduct.1 24 The court agreed,
noting "[h]is violation of the law is not merely a condition, but instead an
integral and essential part of his case and the contributing cause of his alleged
injury."1 25 Similarly, in Inge v. McClelland,126 the court used the "wrongful

conduct" rule to deny a claim against a pharmacist on various over-supply
theories because the prescriptions were procured by the plaintiff in a
conspiracy with a nurse practitioner.1 27 Notwithstanding, some courts take a
somewhat less draconian approach and apply comparative fault even in the
case of a plaintiff s criminal conduct.1 28
Any success that individuals or political units in opioid litigation enjoy
will come at a high price misdirecting the public and policymakers away
from the current epidemic (caused by illicit synthetics) and the fundamental
problem: the social determinants of health. Further, in endorsing a
blame/monetary forfeit model, the litigation will preserve the moral defect
model and the stigmatization that accompanies it.
At some level, the opioid litigation also will perpetuate the recycling of
"supply-side and criminal-justice approaches" rather than "an expanded
public health response."1 29 State attorneys general pursuing pharmaceutical
manufacturers can recycle their tough-on-crime rhetoric, claiming "Purdue's

122. Jared S. Hopkins & Jef Feeley, DrugFirms Blame Opioid Crisis on Illicit Websites,
Dealers, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-07-19/drug-companies-seek-to-blame-opioid-crisis-on-illegal-dealers.
123. 920 So. 2d 479 (Miss. 2006).
124. Id. at 479.
125. Id. at 485.
126. 257 F. Supp. 3d 1158 (D.N.M. 2017).
127. Id. at 1158; see also In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine)
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, 2009 WL 902351, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2009).
128. See, e.g., Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo Cty., 773
S.E.2d 627, 627 (W.Va. 2015).
129. Herzberg et al., supra note 112, at 409.
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pattern is pretty clear. It is a bad company."1 30 Further, if the "problem" is
overprescribing, then the "solutions" must be supply-side strategies. These
strategies, which some of the major commissions who have reported on the
opioid overdose epidemic have endorsed,131 include supply-side interventions
such as limitations on prescribing,1 32 opioid reimbursement reforms,1 33 and

the expansion of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs).1 34
Obviously these strategies will be of limited effectiveness in the face of the
illicit synthetics epidemic, and clearly they fail to address underlying social
determinants.
Worse, such supply-side strategies themselves have negative
consequences. Although the vector model is flawed as an underlying
explanation of the epidemic, there is good evidence that opioid demand is
inelastic,1 35 and those who find it harder to acquire prescription drugs will turn
to street drugs such as fentanyl.1 36
Second, there is concern that supply-side strategies designed to reduce
overutilization will overcompensate and encourage the undertreatment of
pain. 137 Risks of undertreatment are already particularly high among racial
minorities, women, and older adults.1 38 For example, according to Substance

130. The State's Emergency Motion to Show Cause for Purdue's Intentional Disregard of
Two Court Orders and Failure to Provide Witness as Ordered by the Court at *3, Oklahoma ex
rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 2018).
131. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE
OPIOID CRISIS, OFF. OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, FINAL REPORT 9-10 (2017); NAT'L
GOVERNORS Ass'N, GOVERNORS' RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTION To END THE
NATION'S OPIOID CRISIS 7 (2018).

&

-

132. Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guidelinefor PrescribingOpioidsfor ChronicPain
UnitedStates, 2016, 65 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1, 24 (2018); see also S.B. 100 la, 53 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ariz.
2018) (5-day supply); H.B. 21, 25th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018) (3-day supply).
133. Rachel Roubein, CMS Tweaks OpioidProposalAfter Backlash, HILL (Apr. 3, 2018,
5:27 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/381493-cms-tweaks-opioid-proposal-aftersparking-backlash.
134. See generally Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Mandatory Use of Prescription Drug
MonitoringPrograms, 313 JAMA 891, 891 (2015).
135. Zak Slayback, Price Theory Explains the Opiate Crisis, FOUND. ECON. EDUC. (Nov.
20, 2017), https://fee.org/articles/price-theory-explains-the-opiate-crisis.
136. See, e.g., James Martin et al., Effect of Restricting the Legal Supply of Prescription
Opioids on Buying Through Online IllicitMarketplaces: InterruptedTime Series Analysis, 361
BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1 (2018).
137. See generally Marilyn Serafini, The Physicians'Quandarywith Opioids:Pain Versus
Addiction, NEJM CATALYST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/quandary-opioidschronic-pain-addiction; see also Eduardo Bruera, ParenteralOpioid Shortage-TreatingPain
During the Opioid-OverdoseEpidemic, 379 NEw ENG. J. MED. 601, 602 (2018).
138. Uma Suryadevara et al., Opioid Use in the Elderly, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Jan. 30,
2018.
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Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) almost half of
olderAmericans suffer from chronic pain, with the incidence increasing with age. 13 9
Mark Rothstein has argued that "[d]esperately ailing patients who legitimately need
medical relief from serious pain should not be the latest unintended victims of
societal opioid abuse."1 40

Third, there should be concern that successful litigation or a settlement
favoring the plaintiffs will distract policymakers and their constituents from
the far more challenging policy objectives-and their funding-that need to
be addressed. As discussed in the next sections, the resolution of the litigation
likely will have only a minimal role in "solving" the crisis.
V.

THE OPIOID LITIGATION: BARRIERS AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES

It is important at the outset to moderate expectations for the opioid
litigation. There are massive complexities standing in the way of successful
litigation or settlement. These complexities are spread across multiple
dimensions and include the parties' allegations and causes of action, evidence,
the proper parties, and remedies. First, as Rebecca Haffajee and Michelle
Mello have pointed out, there are some key doctrinal and evidentiary barriers
facing the plaintiffs.141 Before a jury, the defendants no doubt will strongly
emphasize that their products were FDA-approved (potentially fatal in a
product liability suit and still salient in an overpromotion case) and adverse
patient behaviors such as doctor-shopping.1 42 Furthermore, with the important
exception of the recent allegations that the Sacker family owners of Purdue
Pharma orchestrated overpromotion, 143 in contrast to the 1990s tobacco
litigation, there have not been whistleblowers coming forward with insider
information or leaked documents.1 44 Moreover, as already noted, the opioid
plaintiffs may be unwilling (for privacy reasons) or unable to prove a nexus
between alleged overpromotion or diversion and a specific prescription order

139. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., OPIOID USE IN THE
OLDER
ADULT
POPULATION
1
(2017),
https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/sites/default/

files/resources/resources-opiod-use-older-adult-pop.pdf.
140. Mark A. Rothstein, The Opioid Crisis and the Need for Compassion in Pain

Management, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1253, 1254 (2017).
141. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 13, at 2303.
142. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
143. See David Armstrong, Purdue's Sackler Embraced Plan to Conceal OxyContin's

Strength from

Doctors,

Sealed

Deposition

Shows,

STAT

(Feb.

21,

2019),

https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/21/purdue-pharma-richard-sackler-oxycontin-sealed-depo
sition/?.

144. Haffajee & Mello, supra note 13, at 2303-04.
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or patient overdose.1 45 Some non-manufacturer defendants have already put
the court on notice that plaintiffs' theories of recovery against them are thin.
In late 2018, two pharmacy chains characterized plaintiffs' claims as calling
for "a boundless expansion of tort doctrine that Ohio law does not
countenance."1 46

Second, the relatively small number of defendant opioid manufacturers
and others in the distribution chain are not in the same financial league by a
wide margin-as the tobacco industry. Although cigarette sales in the United
States have declined considerably over the years, big tobacco's revenue
numbers are increasing, exceeding $93 billion in 2016.147 United States
prescription opioid revenue peaked in 2015 at $8 billion.1 48 By the time
administrative costs and attorney's fees are deducted and proceeds spilt
between hundreds of plaintiffs-the settlement may not resemble the jackpot
some are expecting. Importantly, this assumes that there will be substantial
assets to collect. In an August 2018 filing in his state law action against the
opioid manufacturers, the Oklahoma Attorney General argued, "Purdue is
trying to buy time so it can move assets and employees overseas .

.

. and either

file bankruptcy or leave an empty shell here in the United States for all of the
victims of its corporate greed."1 49
Third, there are salient procedural considerations between the tobacco
and opioid claims that may impact the scope of litigation and the timing or
amount of settlement. The successful tobacco actions were relatively simple;
they were brought by states to recoup their additional Medicaid costs and by
the federal government to punish clearly abhorrent behavior by the tobacco
companies.15 0 Even so, it took half a decade to settle the state tobacco suits
and more than a decade before the federal government's trial victory was
translated into remedial action. In the opioid litigation, the number of MDL

145. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
146. Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report & Recommendation Regarding the
Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint by Defendants CVS Indiana, CVS RX
Services, Rite Aid of Maryland, Walgreen, Walgreen Eastern, and Walmart at 1, In Re Nat'l
Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:18-op-45090-DAP (N.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2018).
147. Jennifer Maloney & Saabira Chaudhuri, Against All Odds, the U.S. Tobacco Industry
is Rolling in Money, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2017, 1:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-stobacco-industry-rebounds-from-its-near-death-experience- 1492968698.
148. FDA ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM TRENDS IN PRESCRIPTION OPioID ANALGESIC
PRODUCTS: QUANTITY, SALES, AND PRICE TRENDS 4 (2018).
149. The State's Emergency Motion to Show Cause for Purdue's Intentional Disregard of
Two Court Orders and Failure to Provide Witness as Ordered by the Court at*2-3, Oklahoma
ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 2018).
150. Andy Schneider & Sara Thom, The Tobacco Settlements: Do All of the Medicaid
Recoveries Belong to the States?, CTR. BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 11, 1997),
https://www.cbpp.org/archives/tobacco.htm.
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plaintiffs, already well over one thousand, ' 5 continues to grow. Equally, the
number of non-MDL state claims is growing, some of which likely now will
reach verdict before the MDL bellwether cases begin. As already noted, it will
be difficult to bring these claims within any global settlement.1 52 Reportedly,
there are also growing tensions between states whose attorneys general are
filing in state court and their smaller political units who have filed in federal
court and then been swept up in the MDL.1 53 Finally, although some of their
claims will be difficult to pursue because of "blameworthy" personal
behavior,1 54 it is unclear how many individual patients, their families, or
children born with NAS may bring individual or class actions, in what is likely
to be an enduring imitation of the tobacco litigation playbook.
Fourth, estimates vary as to the cost of the opioid crisis, rendering
problematic any rational basis for calculating damage awards. A November
2017 report from the Council of Economic Advisors estimated that for just
one year, 2015, the economic cost of the opioid crisis was $504 billion. 5 5 A
2018 study estimated costs between 2001-2017 at over one trillion dollars,
with projected costs of five hundred billion dollars through 2020.156 A study
focused on Indiana estimated that the state-one of the most severely
affected-had suffered $43.3 billion in losses. 1 Plaintiffs are also beginning
to create profiles of financial impact. For example, New Jersey's complaint
against Purdue Pharma estimates that, since 2008, its Medicaid vendors,
workers compensation program, and employee and retiree health plans have
paid well over $290 million for opioids.'15 The City of Tacoma, in its lawsuit
against several pharmaceutical manufacturers, alleged that the opioid crisis
has increased the City's spending across healthcare, social services,
emergency services, and public safety and has implemented a new tax in order

151. Fisher, supra note 57.
152. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
153. Daniel Fisher, Cities vs. States: A Looming Battlefor Control ofHigh-Stakes Opioid
Litigation, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2018 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/
2018/03/28/cities-vs-states-a-looming-battle-for-control-of-high-stakes-opioid-litigation/#7ee 1
e3cc4b5d.
154. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
155. WHITE HOUSE, COUNCIL ECON. ADVISOR, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE
OPIOID
CRISIS
1 (Nov.
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/images/The%/`20Underestimated%/`20Costo20of% 20the%/o200pioid%/o20Crisis.pdf.
156. Economic Toll, supra note 102.
157. Ryan M. Brewer & Kayla M. Freeman, Cumulative Economic Damagesfrom 15
Years of Opioid Misuse Throughout Indiana, 93 IND. BUS. REV. (2018),
http://www.ibrc.indiana.edu/ibr/2018/spring/article 1.html.
158. Complaint for Violation of the New Jersey False Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:32C-1, Et
Seq., as Well as Other Claims at¶ 17, Porrino v. Purdue Pharma (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2017).
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to raise ten million dollars a year to fund opioid response efforts.1 59 In its 2018
lawsuit, New York City is claiming five hundred billion dollars to offset
opioid costs.1 60 Overall, and as the ripples of the opioid epidemic spread and

even merge with other public health problems, it is extremely difficult to find
a rational limit to the damages caused. Do you draw the line at Medicaid
costs? Law enforcement costs? Prisons and jail costs? The growing rates of
Hepatitis C/HIV caused by heroin use? The intergenerational harms caused
by NAS?
Finally, how should any damage "pie" be allocated? The heterogeneous
nature of the losses that individual political units have suffered and the
question of whether damages awarded to political units should be tied directly
to prescription drugs or reflect the broader cost of addictions-likely make
any kind of metric such as a per capita share of any settlement quite
problematic.
Aside from these distinct problems, the opioid litigation and any potential
settlement raise broader issues. Contemporary mass tort actions are not
"normal" lawsuits. They feature "repeat player" attorneys who have forged
deep relationships with MDL judges, and exhibit commercial-even
industrial traits.161 For example, Elizabeth Burch and Margaret Williams
have detailed the impact of lead plaintiff attorneys in MDL litigation and how
"defendants can take advantage of lead attorneys' control over settlement
negotiations to strike deals that benefit the leaders and the defendant, but not
the claimants."162 This is of particular importance as the lead attorneys will
likely receive at least twenty-five percent of any recovery. 163 Even the
financing of such litigation has been revolutionized since the time of the
tobacco settlement, with dedicated financial services businesses-often with

159. Complaint at TT 226, 229, City of Tacoma v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. No. 3:17-cv-5737
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 2017).
160. Mayor de Blasio Announces Lawsuit Against Nation'sLargest OpioidManufacturers
and Distributors, CITY OF N.Y. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/054-18/mayor-de-blasio-lawsuit-against-nation-s-largest-opioid-manufacturers-dist
ributors#/0.
161. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict
Litigation's Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669,
1698-1709 (2017); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70
VAND. L. REV. 67, 67 (2017).
162. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1449 (2017) (citing Charles Silver
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-ClassAction Method ofManaging Multi-DistrictLitigations:
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 110 (2010)).
163. Andrew Harris, Jared Hopkins & Hannah Recht, Justice for Opioid Communities
Means Massive Payday for Their Lawyers, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018), https://www.
bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-opioid-lawsuits.
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ties to lead attomeys--funding litigation with their interests potentially
overtaking those of the claimants.1 64 In the MDL litigation, these apparent
conflicts of interests led to Judge Polster ordering attorneys to disclose any
such relationships to the court.1 65

The pressure to settle also comes at the cost of transparency. There is
already concern over how some information about the pharmaceutical
companies in the MDL litigation is being kept out of public view.1 66 And,
there is no doubt that any settlement will bring with it all manner of
confidentiality mandates. Barry Meier even blames the secrecy surrounding
earlier settlements with opioid manufacturers by the federal government and
some states, claiming it "allowed a containable crisis to mushroom into
catastrophe."1 67

Questions of differential pressures to settle also raise some difficult
timing issues. Are we at the beginning, middle, or end of the opioid epidemic
crisis? In late 2018, the Secretary of Health and Human Services opined that
the country was "beginning to turn the tide."1 68 Positive statements were based
on preliminary CDC data showing a 2.2 percent decline in drug overdose
deaths.1 69 However, even if that data proves accurate, it still shows over half
the states posting an increase in overdose deaths.17 0 Also, a 2018 McKinsey
report argued that the number of persons suffering from OUD is likely to be
an underestimate, with the actual number being between four and six million
persons. 171

164. See generally Lisa Miller, Perils of Third-PartyFundingIf Counsel Discloses Work
Product to a Third-PartyFinancierWho Has No Interest in Maintaining Confidentiality, WorkProduct ProtectionMay Be Waived, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2017, at 19.
165. Julie A. Steinberg, Opioid Litigation Finance Arrangements Must Be Disclosed,
BLOOMBERG LAW (May 7, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/opioid-litigation-financearrangements-must-be-disclosed.
166. See text accompanying infra notes 177-178.
167. Barry Meier, OpioidMakers Are the Big Winners in Lawsuit Settlements, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/opinion/opioids-lawsuits-purduepharma.html.
168. German Lopez, Trump'sHealth Secretary Says the OpioidEpidemicMay Be Turning
Around Not So Fast., Vox (Oct. 24, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2018/10/24/18015532/opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-2 01 8-alex-azar-trump; see also
John Russell, Opioid Epidemic Showing Signs of Turning Corner, State Drug Czar Says, IND.
Bus. J. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.ibj.com/articles/70686-opioid-epidemic-showing-signsof-turning-comer-state-drug-czar-says.
169. Vital Statistics RapidRelease: ProvisionalDrug Overdose Death Counts, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdosedata.htm (last updated Dec. 12, 2018), [hereinafter ProvisionalDrug Overdose Death Counts].
170. Id.
171. Sarun Charumilind et al., Why We Need Bolder Action to Combat the Opioid
Epidemic, McKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-
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Compensation aside, the other purpose of litigation is deterrence. While
some may want any settlement to include a clear statement of fault, the
defendants (as was the case with the tobacco manufacturers in the MSA) are
likely to resist any such admission, particularly with millions of potential
individual plaintiffs waiting in the wings. In fact, as a group, these defendants
seem to have been unfazed by some strong deterrent messages. Back in 2007,
Purdue Pharma and some of its senior executives pleaded guilty to federal
charges of drug misbranding, agreeing to pay $34.5 million in penalties.1 72 In
2008, the opioid manufacturer McKesson Corporation settled a federal
government claim that it had failed to report suspicious sales of controlled
substances and paid $13.25 million in civil penalties.1 73 Nine years later,
however, the same company paid $150 million to settle almost identical
allegations, also agreeing to suspend sales from some of its distribution
centers for a period of years and institute an enhanced compliance program.1 74
Fines and damages aside, these companies seem relatively unworried. In
contrast, much of the tobacco companies' secrecy and campaigns against
scientific evidence of links to lung cancer and other serious diseases likely can
be explained by their fear of government regulation. The opioid manufacturers
are already so subject. Indeed albeit not without controversy in November
2018 the FDA approved new, even more powerful, opioids. 7 5 Related to
deterrence is transparency. However, so far, the MDL litigation has shed little
sunlight on the inner workings of the drug companies. The plaintiffs sought
comprehensive data from the DEA's ARCOS database, but the United States
Justice Department would only release a subset, and then only under

systems-and-services/our-insights/why-we-need-bolder-action-to-combat-the-opioid-epid
emic?.
172. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/ l1drug-web.html.

173. U.S. DEP'T JUST., OFF. PUB. AFF., MCKESSON CORPORATION AGREES TO PAY
MORE THAN $13 MILLION To SETTLE CLAIMS THAT IT FAILED TO REPORT SUSPICIOUS SALES
OF PRESCRIPTION MEDICATIONS (2008).
174. U.S. DEP'T JUST., OFF. PUB. AFF., MCKESSON AGREES TO PAY RECORD $150
MILLION SETTLEMENT FOR FAILURE TO REPORT SUSPICIOUS ORDERS OF PHARMACEUTICAL
DRUGS (2017).
175. Jake Harper, Despite Warnings, FDA Approves PotentNew Opioid Painkiller,NPR
(Nov.
2,
2018,
3:05
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/02
/663395669/despite-warnings-fda-approves-potent-new-opioid-painkiller.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/6

24

Terry: The Opioid Litigation Unicorn
2019]

THE OPIOID LITIGATION UNICORN

661

'

conditions of confidentiality. 7 6 Thereafter, Judge Polster denied a media
Freedom of Information Act request for access.1 77
Notwithstanding the various litigation difficulties faced by plaintiffs and
the very real problems of achieving a global settlement, it has to be assumed
that eventually a settlement of some sort will be reached. Any settlement
likely will have two components. First, there will be a monetary component,
giving rise to questions about how the sums collected will be used. Second,
there will be a public health component, with provisions designed to reduce
the negative impact of the opioid crisis and, probably, to reduce the possibility
of another addiction crisis. 171
As to the first, prior actions are instructive. For example, in 2016,
Indiana's Attorney General used moneys recovered from a settlement of offlabel and deceptive marketing of non-opioid drugs by pharmaceutical
companies to equip first responders with naloxone.1 79 In contrast, West
Virginia used proceeds from its 2004 settlement with Purdue Pharma to fund
the state's police academy fitness center and other remodeling at the
academy.'o The latter example raises a sobering question will any opioid
judgment or settlement funds be applied to opioid relief or will they, like the
MSA tobacco funds, be diverted from public health purposes to general tax
funds?' 8
As with the tobacco settlement, it seems unlikely that anything beyond
aspirational statements would be mutually agreeable to all the plaintiffs. As a
result, the question will become one for the political units. There are tools that
states can use to protect the funds. For example, following the tobacco
settlement, some states passed supplantation laws essentially prohibiting the
use of tobacco moneys to replace existing funding for programs such as

176. Eric Heisig, Justice Department Agrees to Release Painkiller Data to Aid Opioid
Litigation Settlement Talks, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/
court-justice/index.ssf/2018/03/justicedepartment agreesto_r.html;
see also
Stephan
Montemayor, Judge Vindicates MinneapolisAttorney's Questfor More Information on Opioids,
STAR TRIBUNE (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-judge-blasts-doj-deaorders-them-to-negotiate-release-of-records-kept-from-local-attorney/410562325.
177. Eric Heisig, Federal Judge in Opioid Litigation Won't Allow Release of Painkiller
Sales, Shipment Data to Media, CLEVELAND.COM (July 26, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/
court-justice/index.ssf/2018/07/federal judgein opioidlitiga.html.
178. See generally Herzberg et al., supra note 112, at 409.
179. Niki Kelly, Kits to Allow Emergency Workers to Halt Overdose, J. GAZETTE (Mar.
15, 2016,
5:19 PM),
http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/indiana/Kits-to-allowemergency-workers-to-halt-overdose-962 1358.
180. West Virginia Uses OxyContin Settlement Money to Build Gym, NAT'L PAIN REP.
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://nationalpainreport.com/west-virginia-uses-oxycontin-settlement-moneyto-build-a-gym-8814021.html.
181. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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smoking cessation or healthcare. 182 A few states used ballot initiatives in an
attempt to balance competing demands. Louisiana voters approved
Amendment 2, which allocated seventy-five percent of tobacco monies to a
trust fund providing college scholarships, funds for school districts, and health
programs. 8 3 Some states went further and sought to shelter some of the
tobacco monies in separate funds dedicated to tobacco control or other public
health initiatives. For example, Florida committed to allocate monies to
tobacco control, although it then reduced the spending because of a budget
crisis. 184 Hawaii created a special fund into which settlement funds were to be
deposited and split the proceeds between the state general and reserve funds,
tobacco prevention (12.5 percent), and University healthcare facilities
(twenty-six percent).'8 5 Maine created the Fundfor a Healthy Maine and
committed fifty million dollars per year to the fund that was to be used
(without supplantation) for healthcare and public health programs, including
smoking cessation and control. Increasingly, however, the state has diverted
funds to pay for Medicaid.1 8 6
In general, the economies of the states are healthier than at any time since
the great recession. 187 With increased tax revenue"' and larger federal
contributions, 8 9 they have partially rebuilt their rainy-day funds. However,
Medicaid spending continues to increase,' 90 and the upper Midwest and
southern states that are among the hardest hit by the opioid epidemic are

182. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-1011(c) (2000).
183. Louisiana Tobacco Settlement Fund Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA.ORG (Oct. 1999),
https://ballotpedia.org/LouisianaTobaccoSettlementFundAmendment (October 1999).
184. Sloan et al., supra note 95, at 223-25.

185. HAW. REV. STAT.,

§ 328L-2(b)

(2015).

186. ME. PUB. HEALTH Ass'N, SUCCESS STORY OR MISSED OPPORTUNITY? A BRIEF
HISTORY OF THE FUND FOR A HEALTHY MAINE 1 (2007).
187. See generally Fiscal 50: State Trends andAnalysis, In Ninth Year ofRecovery States'
Fiscal
and
Economic
Prospects
Perk
Up,
PEW
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2014/05/19/fiscal-50-state-trendsand-analysis.
188. Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, Decade after Recession Began, Tax Revenue
Higher in 34 States, PEW (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#ind0.
189. Fiscal50: State Trends andAnalysis, FederalShare ofState Revenue Rises for Third
Year, PEW (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-

visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#indl.
190. Fiscal50: State Trends andAnalysis, More Than 17 Percent ofState Revenue Goes
to Medicaid, PEW (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-

visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#ind7.
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showing slower growth.191 Some states may take the opportunity to cabin
opioid litigation funds for the treatment of those with OUD, caring for
children suffering from NAS, and the building of community resilience.
Sadly, however, it is likely that some states will use the money for general
revenue purposes or for unproductive opioid measures such as criminal law
enforcement. Politicians will claim a massive victory over the "evil" drug
companies that caused the epidemic, but those who suffered or continue to
suffer-are unlikely to see the spoils of war. Such a result would be
unfortunate and a lost opportunity. Addiction crises are not only not new, but
additional crises continue to break like waves; witness the recent increase in
hospitalizations because of amphetamine use.1 92 However, federal and state
responses to these crises tend to emphasize supply-side models (such as
criminalization or prescription monitoring) rather than preventative public
health strategies. 19' In fact, public health at both the federal and state level
remains chronically underfunded. Per capita funding at the state level is low
and is often flat, year-over-year,1 94 far less than spending on healthcare' 95 or
law enforcement.1

96

The second probable component of any opioid litigation settlement will
be non-monetary some commitment placed on the defendants to change
their behavior and reduce or reverse the adverse effects of their practices. For
example, in the tobacco settlement, the manufacturers agreed to restrict
advertising and sponsorships, particularly those that targeted youth. 197
Further, the MSA used a "volume adjustment," a hydraulic model providing

191. Barb Rosewicz & Joe Fleming, Look West for Strongest Growth Since the Recession,
PEW (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/11/19/

look-west-for-strongest-growth-since-the-recession.
192. Tyler N. A. Winkelman et al., Evaluation ofAmphetamine-Related Hospitalizations
andAssociatedClinical Outcomes and Costs in the United States, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Oct.

19, 2018, at 1, 13.
193. Herzberg et al., supra note 112, at 409-10.
194. A Funding Crisis for Public Health and Safety, TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH
(2018), https://www.tfah.org/report-details/a-funding-crisis-for-public-health-and-safety-stateby-state-and-federal-public-health-funding-facts-and-recommendations.
195. See Micah Hartman et al., National Health Care Spending in 2016: Spending and
Enrollment Growth Slow After Initial Coverage Expansions,37 HEALTH AFF. 150, 150 (2018).
196. Police and Corrections Expenditures, URB. INST., https://www.urban.org/policycenters/cross-center-initiatives/state-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/
police-and-corrections-expenditures (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
197. Master Settlement Agreement Restrictions on Tobacco Company Lobbying Efforts,
CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 1, 1 (July 28, 2005), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/
assets/factsheets/0064.pdf.
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a mechanism that would reduce the damages to be paid if the number of
cigarettes sold in a state was reduced.198
In a February 2018 hearing, Judge Polster reportedly announced the
following:
What I'm interested in doing is not just moving money around,
because this is an ongoing crisis. What we've got to do is
dramatically reduce the number of the pills that are out there and
make sure that the pills that are out there are being used properly.
Because we all know that a whole lot of them have gone walking and
with devastating results.199
An obvious analogue to the tobacco settlement would be sharp
curtailment of opioid marketing. However, Purdue Pharma has already
announced it will cease marketing opioids, stating that it had "restructured and
significantly reduced [its] commercial operation and will no longer be
promoting opioids to prescribers." 200 This approach also misses the fact that
opioids are not tobacco-like, but are FDA-approved pharmaceuticals subject
to labeling and marketing restrictionS 201 that clearly have a place in the
national formulary. Further, reductions in consumption are being promoted
using different models such as limitations on prescribing, 202 opioid
reimbursement reforms, 203 and the expansion of Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs (PDMPs). 204 There is also a very real public health cost

198. Adjustments to the States' Tobacco Settlement Receipts, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCOFREE KIDS 1, 1 (Jan.10, 2001), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0070.pdf.
199. Charlie Ban, Federal Judge in Opioid Case Fast Tracking Distribution Changes,
NAT'L Ass'N COUNTIES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.naco.org/articles/federal-judge-opioidcase-fast-tracking-distribution-changes.
200. Jared S. Hopkins, Pain Pill Giant Purdue to Stop Promotion of Opioids to Doctors,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2018, 8:16:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0210/pain-pill-giant-purdue-to-stop-promotion-of-opioids-to-doctors.
201. See text accompanying supra notes 15-17.
202. Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guidelinefor PrescribingOpioids for Chronic PainUnitedStates, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1,1 (2016).

203. 2019 Medicare Advantage and PartD Advance Notice PartII and Draft Call Letter,
U.S.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/

newsroom/fact-sheets/2019-medicare-advantage-and-part-d-advance-notice-part-ii-and-draftcall-letter.
204. See generally Haffajee et al., supra note 134, at 891-92.
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associated with reducing the supply of prescription opioids, such as drug
seekers turning to far more dangerous illicit drugs such as fentanyl. 205
A better approach might be to hold the settling drug companies
responsible for a proportion of the cost of supplying the harm-reducing drug
naloxone or the drugs used in evidence-based, medication-assisted treatment
(methadone, naltrexone, and buprenorphine), thus tying their ultimate
responsibility to the continuing costs of the crisis. Indeed, in September 2018,
Purdue Pharma made a $3.4 million grant to a Pittsburgh nonprofit to develop
a low-cost naloxone nasal spray in a move that was disparaged by MDL
plaintiffs' lawyers as a publicity stunt.206
One model that the states might adopt would be something akin to New
York's opioid "tax." In March 2018, the New York legislature included an
annual one hundred million dollar excise tax on companies who manufacture
or distribute opioids in the state. The tax is imposed on the basis of market
share with the proceeds placed into a "stewardship fund" designed to finance
behavioral health programs. 207 In July 2018, a trade group representing
distributors filed suit in federal district court, arguing the tax was
unconstitutional, 208 and drug manufacturers subsequently filed similar
lawsuits. 209 Reportedly, a substantial number of states are considering a
similar approach to pay for their treatment and prevention. 210
The most obvious problem with the New York approach is that the costs
incurred by states, cities, and counties are caused by the non-medical use of
street drugs, and deaths from synthetic drugs have already overtaken those
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from prescription drugs. 21' As a result, tying damages to prescription drug
distribution may have little positive public health impact. Further, while these
types of proposals seem to be appropriate and proportional, they do little to
build resilience or prepare for the next addiction crisis to hit the United States
(likely to be addiction to benzodiazepines) 212 and the needs for early diagnosis
and treatment that almost inevitably will follow.
VI. CONCLUSION

More than two million Americans suffer from substance use disorder, 2 13
more than half a million died from drug overdoses between 1999 and 2015,214
and current projections suggest an annual death toll approaching seventy
thousand. 215 This is an epidemic that is affecting multiple demographics as it
morphs from a prescription-drug epidemic impacting older rural whites to an
illicit drug epidemic increasingly impacting urban communities of color. 216 It

is a scourge destroying families and placing public services under
extraordinary pressure.
As such, it is not difficult to understand the motivations behind the opioid
litigation in its many forms and venues. Indeed, there is every reason to
demand that those who profited from aspects of the epidemic should pay for
some of its amelioration. Neither would there be many who would object to
hard-hit communities receiving an injection of funds to rebuild and provide
for those who are suffering. And while allocating blame through litigation
risks giving credence to the moral defect theory, those suffering with OUD
likely will prefer the blame shifting from themselves to those in the
pharmaceutical distribution chain.
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AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, RESULTS FROM THE 2015 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES (2016).
214. Puja Seth et al., Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and
Psychostimulants-UnitedStates 2015-2016, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 349,
351 (2018).
215. ProvisionalDrug Overdose Death Counts, supra note 169.
216. Shanoor Seervai, Arnav Shah & Eric C. Schneider, The U.S. Has Two Opioid
Epidemics: The Federal Response Should Consider Both, To THE PoINT (Mar. 22, 2018),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2018/mar/federal-response-to-opioids.
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Unfortunately, litigation is a blunt instrument that to the extent it is
effective at all-is best suited to well prescribed, narrow claims between
individuals or between an individual and a corporation. Litigation does not
scale well, and it is not a good tool for remedying mass social ills. It is also
extremely inefficient both in its procedural costs (including attorneys' fees
and other expenses) and a lack of timely resolution that almost guarantees that
any recovery will be too late to help those who are currently suffering. For
example, the California lead paint litigation began in 2000, and it was not until
2018 that the Supreme Court denied certiorari.217 The asbestos cases, the
longest running mass tort litigation in the United States, never produced a
8
global settlement. 21

As a result, the question raised at the beginning of this Article about a
judicial solution to the opioid crisis is relatively easy to answer. Any
compensatory payments will be too little, too late, and, if history is any
predictor, unlikely to be distributed to those actually harmed. Additionally,
the opioid litigation is tied to relatively limited views of the opioid crisis
(prescription opioids-not illegal synthetics such as fentanyl) and its
remediation (supply-side strategies). And while there is plenty of blame to go
around, adopting a blameworthy frame-as litigation must perpetuates the
moral defect narrative of addiction. Worse, liability of those in the
pharmaceutical chain of distribution will be analogous to the criminalization
of the addicted, a similarly short-term disparagement of some actors which
fails to address root causes and evidence-based, public health approaches to
society's cycles of addiction.
Of the MDL plaintiff political units, sixty percent have above-average
poverty rates. 219 If the MDL litigation and its state court fellow travelers are
to achieve anything positive other than rewarding plaintiffs' lawyers and
adding a few million dollars to states' general funds, any settlement must
address the negative social determinants of health that lie at the root of the
opioid epidemic and build healthier environments that will reduce the
likelihood of future addiction crises.
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PlOK.
218. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 1, 47 (2005).
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